Aviation Alerts

PLEASE NOTE: The Cessna Flyer Association posts Airworthiness Directives, Alerts and Service Bulletins as a courtesy for our members and for information only. This listing in not complete and should not be used as the official source of this information. It is up to you to do proper research on what ADs and SBs are appropriate for your aircraft. You are encouraged to contact your licensed A&P mechanic and to reference the official FAA website for correct information. http://www.faa.gov/aircraft/safety/alerts/

Reason for Airworthiness Concern:

Latent failure of FreeFlight Systems ADS-B unit, model number FDL-978-XVR, to display air traffic or transmit location to other aircraft with active ADS-B In.

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Description of Airworthiness Concern:

Request for Information (For example: Proposed alternate inspection or repair procedures, cost impact, etc. Your comments or replies to the FAA need to be as specific as possible. Please provide specific examples to illustrate your comments or concerns.)

We have received reports of latent failures of FreeFlight model FDL-978-XVR ADS-B units. Troubleshooting determined that some units failed completely, while other units failed intermittently. Attempts to update the software and change any unit settings failed, as most parameters were “greyed out” and unable to be changed. Additionally, the failed units gave no indication of failure to the pilot.

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2018-1081; Product Identifier 2018-NE-39-AD; Amendment 39-19676; AD 2019-13-03]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Trig Avionics Limited Transponders
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.

––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Trig Avionics Limited TT31, Avidyne Corporation AXP340, and BendixKing/Honeywell International KT74 Mode S transponders. This AD was prompted by the discovery that the retaining cam that engages in the mounting tray may not withstand g-forces experienced during an emergency landing. This AD requires one-time inspection of the transponder installation and, depending on the findings, removal of the affected transponder for modification. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective August 27, 2019.

Download PDF of this AD below:

 

FAA Aviation Safety

SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETIN

SUBJ: Flight Controls; Cable Terminals Used on 14 CFR Part 23 and CAR Part 3 Airplanes with Mechanical Flight Control Cables

SAIB: CE-19-13

Date: July 2, 2019

This is information only. Recommendations aren’t mandatory.

Introduction

 

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin alerts owners, operators, maintenance technicians, and inspectors of an airworthiness concern, specifically cracking and fracturing of flight control cable terminal attachment fittings connected to turnbuckle barrels on all 14 CFR part 23 and CAR part 3 airplanes with mechanical flight control cables.

With the exception of AD 2013-02-13, which addresses specific turnbuckle connections in the stabilator control system on certain Piper Aircraft Inc. airplane models, at this time, the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39. However, the FAA continues to monitor this concern, and may take additional action based on data received from operators and/or further examination.

Background

Turnbuckle connections are widely used in flight control systems on a multitude of airplane models that utilize mechanical flight control cables. The FAA has, over the years, received numerous reports of failures of the cable/turnbuckle attachment fittings, which have caused or have the potential to cause loss of flight control in one axis. In many cases, the failures have been discovered during inspection or ground operations. For those that occurred in flight, the pilot was often able to land the airplane without damage, although this can be very challenging. Accidents with substantial damage have occurred in some cases.

FAA Aviation Safety
SPECIAL AIRWORTHINESS INFORMATION BULLETIN
SUBJ: Equipment/Furnishings: Emergency Locator Beacon, G-Switch Failures
SAIB: CE-19-12
Date: June 18, 2019
This is information only. Recommendations aren’t mandatory.

Introduction

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts you, aircraft owners and operators with installations of ACR Electronics, Inc. (ACR)(formerly Artex Aircraft Supplies, Inc. and Chelton Avionics, Inc. and doing business as Wulfsberg Electronics) emergency locator transmitters (ELT) G406-4, C406-1, C406-1HM, C406-2, C406-2HM, C406-N and C406-NHM identified by Part Number (P/N) and serial number (s/n) in Table 1 of this SAIB, of an airworthiness concern, specifically the ELT not transmitting alert and location signals in case of an accident due to an inoperative or a deteriorated G-switch. ELTs located in high vibration environments, for example in the tail of a helicopter, could have its acceleration sensor deteriorate after having been subjected to high levels of shock and vibration for five (5) years or more. This SAIB recommends best practices for the inspection, modification and replacement of these ELTs located in high vibration environments.

ELT Model P/N s/n (up to, inclusive)

G406-4 453-5012 210-08575
C406-1 453-5002 210-09438
C406-1HM 453-5003 All
C406-2 453-5000 210-09501
C406-2HM 453-5001 210-09936
C406-N 453-5060 252-01689
C406-NHM 453-5061 252-02321

 

Table 1: SAIB Applicability (Note this applicability is regardless of whether there are additional digits and Revision status appended to the ELT P/N, e.g. 453-5003-123 Rev B. is an affected P/N.)

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Description of Ainvorthiness Concern 

On May 26, 2019, a Cessna Model 210M airplane suffered an in-flight separation of the right wing, resulting in a fatal accident. Preliminary investigation of the accident indicated that the wing fractured due to fatigue cracking inboard of the wing attachment lugs. Current details regarding the Australian Transportation Safety Bureau's investigation into the accident can be found online: https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications/investigation_reports/2019/aair/ao-2019-026/

 

Date: June 10, 2019

This Revised Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) clarifies the recommendation regarding the dispositioning of jet fuel contaminated with Diesel Exhaust Fluid (DEF). The SAIB advises airplane operators, fixed base operators (FBOs), FAA repair stations, Flight Standard District Offices (FSDOs), and foreign civil aviation authorities of certain airplanes that uplifted jet fuel contaminated with DEF, or uplifted jet fuel using refueling equipment that was exposed to DEF. This SAIB also requests feedback regarding any service difficulties or operational anomalies of the identified airplanes and recommends that the owners of those airplanes consult with the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of their airplane, engine, and auxiliary power unit (APU) to determine the appropriate inspection and corrective maintenance actions on their airplane. This revision corrects and clarifies the Recommendations paragraph.

Date: June 10, 2019

This Revised Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) clarifies the recommendation regarding the dispositioning of jet fuel contaminated with Diesel Exhaust Fluid (DEF). The SAIB advises airplane operators, fixed base operators (FBOs), FAA repair stations, Flight Standard District Offices (FSDOs), and foreign civil aviation authorities of certain airplanes that uplifted jet fuel contaminated with DEF, or uplifted jet fuel using refueling equipment that was exposed to DEF. This SAIB also requests feedback regarding any service difficulties or operational anomalies of the identified airplanes and recommends that the owners of those airplanes consult with the original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) of their airplane, engine, and auxiliary power unit (APU) to determine the appropriate inspection and corrective maintenance actions on their airplane. This revision corrects and clarifies the Recommendations paragraph.

This AD applies to Textron Aviation, Inc. (type certificate previously held by Cessna Aircraft Company) Models 525, 525A, and 525B airplanes, certificated in any category, with Tamarack active load alleviation system (ATLAS) winglets installed in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA03842NY.

 

Introduction

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts, owners, operators, and certified repair facilities that all Lycoming Engines (Lycoming) engines equipped with certain Parallel Valve Cylinders and Head Assemblies, which were shipped from Lycoming between September 1, 2013 and April 30, 2015, have experienced cracking in service.

At this time, the airworthiness concern is not considered an unsafe condition that would warrant airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR) part 39.

Download PDF for full details

Cessna Single Engine Service Letter
SEL-24-10
March 12, 2019
MANDATORY

Electrical Power-Master Control Unit Inspection and Replacement Of Wire Harness

EFFECTIVITY
MODEL SERIAL NUMBERS
172S 172S12111, 172S12116, 172S12118, 172S12120, 172S12124, 172S12126, 172S12128, 172S12129, 172S12133, 172S12134, 172S12135, 172S12136, 172S12192
182T 18283030, 18283031, 18283032
206H 20608313
T206H T20609528, T20609529, T20609530, T20609531, T20609532

Click below to download entire Service Letter.

 

 

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin is to alert owners, operators, and maintenance technicians of an issue that could affect crew visibility when utilizing full face masks/smoke goggles manufactured by Collins Aerospace (formerly Rockwell Collins, B/E Aerospace). 

At this time, the airworthiness concern is not an unsafe condition that would warrant any additional airworthiness directive (AD) action under Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 39. 

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Zodiac Aerotechnics (Zodiac) oxygen mask regulators. This AD was prompted by reports that certain silicon harness inflation hoses installed on certain flight crew quick donning mask harnesses have shown an unusually high premature rupture rate. This AD requires inspection and replacement of certain oxygen mask regulator harness inflation hoses. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products. 

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin is to alert owners, operators, and maintenance technicians of Textron Aviation Inc. (Textron) Model 172R, 172S, 182S, 182T, T182T, 206H, T206H airplanes, of failure of the “Sensor-Oil Pressure (Hobbs Switch)”, part number (P/N) 83278 as it is referred to in the illustrated parts catalogue. These engine oil pressure switches could have been provided new with the airplane or as a spares replacement part.

We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Aspen Avionics, Inc. (Aspen), Evolution Flight Display (EFD) EFD1000 Primary Flight Display (PFD), EFD1000 Multi- Function Display (MFD), EFD1000 Emergency Backup Display (EBD), and EFD500 MFD units installed on various aircraft. This AD requires disabling the Automatic Dependent Surveillance- Broadcast (ADS-B) In function and revising the Airplane Flight Manual Supplement (AFMS). This AD was prompted by reports of flight displays repetitively resetting. We are issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

Potential decreased service life of Slick 4-cylinder magneto distributor gear assemblies. Based on process and component improvements following the initial release of this service bulletin, the serial number range is being extended in this revision. Magnetos previously returned for compliance to SB1-15 must be returned or inspected for compliance to this revision SB1-15A.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin is to alert owners, operators, and maintenance technicians of Textron Aviation Inc. (Textron) Model 208B airplanes of failure of the oil system “Valve – Flap Check” on serial numbers 208B2197 and 208B5000 and on. These airplanes are commonly referred to as “208B EX” or “EX” and incorporate the Textron PT6A-140 engine installation.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) advises airplane operators, fixed base operators (FBOs), FAA repair stations, Flight Standards District Offices (FSDOs), and foreign civil aviation authorities of jet fuel supplies for which the concentration of aromatic hydrocarbons and the net heat of combustion may not have been measured in accordance with methods specified by the type certificate (TC) holder. These jet fuel supplies would not be compliant with the FAA approved jet fuel operating limitations and should not be used on the TC holders’ products.

A recent accident involving an in-flight propeller failure and separation has again brought to light the need for continued diligence in the use of liquid penetrant inspection methods.

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) advises airplane operators, fixed base operators (FBOs), FAA repair stations, Flight Standards District Offices (FSDOs), and foreign civil aviation authorities of certain airplanes that uplifted jet fuel contaminated with diesel exhaust fluid (DEF), or uplifted jet fuel using refueling equipment that was exposed to DEF.

This revised Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) informs owners, operators, repair stations, and flight standard district offices that compliance with a new or revised airworthiness limitation section (ALS) issued by a design approval holder (DAH), or other entity, as a type design change is not mandatory for in-service aircraft operating pursuant to Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) part 91, unless the aircraft owner/operator voluntarily incorporates the change, it is mandated by an airworthiness directive (AD) to resolve an unsafe condition or required by a previously agreed upon maintenance program..

This Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) alerts registered owners, operators, and certified repair facilities of all airplanes equipped with Teledyne Continental Motors (TCM) Model C75, C85, C90, C125, C145, O-200, O-300, and GO-300 series and Rolls-Royce plc (RR) C90, O-200 and O-300 series reciprocating engines of miscommunication regarding the applicability section of AD 94-05-05 R1, effective on February 13, 1996. The FAA has received reports that FAA personnel have provided guidance that has resulted in confusion on complying with AD 94-05-05R1. The intent of this SAIB is to correct this miscommunication.

A recent accident involving an in-flight propeller failure and separation has again brought to light the need for continued diligence in the use of liquid penetrant inspection methods.

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